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Abstract 
This paper offers a phenomenological account of our relationship 
to our smartphones rooted in the work of philosophers Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961) and Drew Leder (1954–). We argue that 
the nature of this relationship has implications for the ways we con-
ceptualize and promote information literacy in the era of mobile 
ubiquity. After reviewing recent LIS literature on mobile devices in 
libraries, we discuss Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the habit body and 
Drew Leder’s development of the Merleau-Pontian concept of incor-
poration. We then apply these concepts to our use of smartphones, 
paying particular attention to the incorporation of the smartphone 
in our bodily habit and what this means for our relationship to the 
information we access on this device. The paper concludes by consid-
ering how the insights from this analysis of the smartphone could be 
integrated into existing information literacy conversations through 
the lens of dispositions.
Introduction
Over the last decade, there has been a great deal written in library and in-
formation science (LIS), education, and related fields on how the increas-
ing prevalence of mobile devices has changed the way people, particularly 
teenagers and young adults, consume and interact with information. Hy-
perconnectedness to information via our mobile devices is often heralded 
as a positive development that libraries should embrace. In this paper, we 
challenge this general sentiment. Although increased information access 
offers considerable advantages, we need to operate from a fuller under-
standing of the way in which that information is accessed, as well as the 
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unintended, often unseen, effects of this method of access. This requires 
an understanding of the role of embodiment in information access. 
This paper will apply concepts from philosophical phenomenology de-
veloped by Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961) and Drew Leder (1954–), 
specifically the concepts of bodily habit and incorporation, to our rela-
tionship to smartphones. While some research in LIS has adopted the 
methodology of empirical phenomenology popular in the social sciences, 
little work has been offered that adopts philosophical phenomenological 
concepts. Empirical phenomenology in the social sciences is character-
ized by the researcher’s attempt to suspend any preconceived notion of 
the phenomenon she tries to study, followed by a discussion of themes that 
arise during the course of her study. This normally takes the form of the 
researcher interviewing subjects on their experience or thoughts of some 
phenomenon and then looking for common patterns in reports of expe-
rience (see, for instance, Groenewald 2004; Hein and Austin 2001; Kafle 
2013). In order to offer the analysis necessary to understand our relation-
ship to our smartphones, however, we adopt an explicitly Merleau-Pontian 
phenomenological framework. Central to this framework is a commitment 
to the suspension of what phenomenologists call the “natural attitude” 
and an understanding of the intentionality of embodied consciousness 
when we analyze a particular phenomenon. In this study, we will analyze 
the ways in which our smartphones appear to us in our everyday experi-
ence. We will attempt “to articulate what was previously just lived out” 
(Taylor 2005, 32), and, using the work of Leder and Merleau-Ponty, we 
will render visible certain unseen facets of our bodies’ relationships to our 
smartphones and explore how elements of this relationship might affect 
the way in which we conceptualize the use of our smartphones.1 We will 
argue that the nature of this relationship has implications for the ways 
we conceptualize and promote information literacy in the era of mobile 
ubiquity.
Mobile Devices and Libraries
Although internet-enabled mobile devices have been around since the 
1990s, they gained widespread adoption in the first decade of the twenty-
first century (Fling 2009). In 2015, the Pew Research Center reported that 
smartphone ownership among adults had risen to 68 percent from 35 
percent just four years earlier (Anderson 2015). Discussions about the 
impact of these devices on every aspect of our lives have become almost as 
ubiquitous as the devices themselves. 
Much has been written in the LIS literature over the past decade about 
the ways that mobile devices are changing information seeking and re-
trieval, and the implications for academic libraries in providing outreach, 
reference, instruction, and access to resources (see Barnhart and Pierce 
2011; Bridges, Gascho Rempel, and Griggs 2010; Dold 2016; Dukic, Chiu, 
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and Lo 2015; Murray 2010). The rise of mobile devices has prompted 
many to consider how librarians and educators can utilize them to reach 
the current generation of students. A 2014 EDUCAUSE study of under-
graduates at 214 institutions found that 86 percent own smartphones, and 
59 percent use them for coursework (Dahlstrom, Walker, and Dziuban 
2014, 15). A full five years before this, in “Libraries and the Mobile Revo-
lution,” Michelle Leigh Jacobs recounts walking around the library and 
noticing that almost every student has a mobile phone in front of them, 
along with their other study materials. She argues that today’s library users 
“[expect] everything at their fingertips regardless of where they are,” and 
that libraries should strive to meet this expectation by making their re-
sources and content available through mobile devices (Jacobs 2009, 288). 
A number of subsequent studies support this claim. Hudson (2010) found 
that a majority of students said they would make use of reference services 
over their mobile devices if it were available. A study from the same year 
indicated that smartphone adoption was increasing sharply and students 
expect services and resources to be available to them “on the go” (S. Wil-
son and McCarthy 2010, 225). More recently, a survey of undergraduates 
at The College of New Jersey found that 99 percent of respondents own 
some sort of mobile device, and a majority want to be able to search data-
bases on these devices (Cowell and Mi 2016).
Much of the literature falls somewhere on the spectrum from cautiously 
optimistic to very enthusiastic about how mobile devices will change how 
library users do research and find information, while acknowledging that 
it is impossible to predict exactly what this change will look like. In a pas-
sage that reverberates in our current political moment, Jacobs writes, “It is 
okay not to know how these new tools will reshape access to knowledge. If 
five years ago, someone told you that major newspapers would close their 
doors and cease publication and that some of the world’s most promi-
nent news services, even the president of the USA would communicate to 
the public through a series of 140 character comments, you would have 
deemed the idea highly improbable and ridiculous” (2009, 288–89). She 
continues, “This can be a very exciting time for libraries. Information is in 
demand 24/7 because of the advances in technology. There is almost no 
way to escape ‘being wired,’ and we can cash in on this” (290). 
Discussions around mobile devices are often framed in terms of oppor-
tunities or imperatives for libraries. Mobile devices offer libraries and uni-
versities the opportunity to transform learning and engagement, and to 
contribute to student success (Foley and Bertel 2015; Lippincott 2010). 
Libraries can use mobile devices to promote participatory culture and new 
forms of engagement with their communities (Hopkins et al. 2015), and 
to make their resources more accessible (Hennig 2016). Libraries must 
adapt themselves to Millennial expectations for real-time, on-demand ser-
vices (Breeding 2006); they should move quickly in order to keep pace 
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with mobile development and establish leadership in this area on their 
campuses (Lippincott 2008). Mobile devices offer the opportunity to “dra-
matically [impact] how libraries deliver services to their users” (Murray 
2010, 245); libraries should take advantage of the near-ubiquity of mobile 
devices among students to better gain their attention (Vassilakaki, Moni-
arou-Papaconstantinou, and Garoufallou 2016).
Questioning Our Relationship to Mobile Devices
In short, much of the applied LIS literature over the past ten years has 
framed the hyperconnectedness and ease of information access facilitated 
by our mobile devices as a development that libraries should embrace. 
Implicit in many of these discussions is the assumption that our infor-
mation consumption via mobile devices, though potentially ubiquitous, 
is still volitional and under our considered control. We agree that mobile 
devices have had a substantial impact, much of it positive, on the ways 
that academic libraries support student learning, and we do not deny that 
increased ease of information access offers considerable advantages. How-
ever, we contend that we need to operate from a fuller understanding of 
the way in which that information is accessed, as well as the unintended, 
often unseen, effects of this method of access. This requires an under-
standing of the role of embodiment in information access.
Research in a number of fields has problematized the idea of an en-
tirely volitional relationship to our mobile devices and the platforms to 
which they allow access. There is support for this in fields like neurosci-
ence, public health, and psychology, with studies on the positive affective 
experience of social media use (Mauri et al. 2011), as well as the addictive 
nature of social media (Kuss and Griffiths 2011) and cell phones (De-Sola 
Gutiérrez, de Fonseca, and Rubio 2016), and resultant emotional exhaus-
tion (Sriwilai and Charoensukmongkol 2016). We offer a phenomenologi-
cal analysis because, while we have data on the ubiquity of these devices 
and the potential that our relationship to them is not entirely volitional 
(see, for example, Rainie and Zickuhr 2015), phenomenological analysis 
provides improved understanding of what happens between an individual 
and her phone. Understanding how her phone is used and how this use 
remains, for the most part, unthinking will help us find ways to encourage 
more reflective use of mobile devices.2
Merleau-Ponty and the Habits of the  
Phenomenal Body
Phenomenology is a philosophical movement and a methodology that 
aims to describe the structures of human consciousness as experienced by 
persons (see Heidegger [1927] 1962; Husserl [1913] 1963; Merleau-Ponty 
[1945] 1962). Phenomenologists explore any number of these structures, 
including perception, memory, time, sociality, and embodiment (Sokolow- 
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ski 2000). What phenomenologists share is the attempt to expose these 
experiences as they appear before we conceptualize them. Phenomenolo-
gists work against “the natural attitude,” or our everyday understandings 
of and beliefs about the world around us. We tend to take for granted the 
reality of our prereflective grasp on the world, and phenomenologists aim 
to suspend this natural attitude (Bullington 2013, 19).
In Phenomenology of Perception, Maurice Merleau-Ponty theorizes a key 
place for human embodiment in phenomenological analysis.3 The term 
used by phenomenologists for the central structure of all human expe-
rience and consciousness is intentionality. To say that human conscious-
ness is intentional is to say that consciousness is always consciousness of 
something and that consciousness “reaches out” toward its object. For his 
predecessors, embodiment, although considered important to a phenom-
enological understanding of human nature, was not theorized as central 
to intentionality in particular. Merleau-Ponty insists, however, that embodi-
ment is crucial to a full understanding of consciousness and intentional-
ity. “Consciousness is being-towards-the-thing through the intermediary of 
the body” (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 1962, 159–60).
More than this, the body is essential to the development of subjectivity. 
The body not only offers the medium through which consciousness grasps 
the world, but determines the bounds of the world and the limits of the 
subject’s ability to make meaning. It is through our bodies that we are 
“at grips with the world” (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 1962, 353). Bodily com-
portment is ultimately necessary to and for intelligent comportment; the 
body is the constituting subject, and the consciousness-world relationship 
cannot be accounted for without the body and the structures it provides 
that allow for comprehensible movement and experience. Merleau-Ponty 
calls this connectedness of embodied consciousness and the world the 
phenomenal body (121).
Merleau-Ponty ([1945] 1962, xx) references Husserl’s notion of opera-
tive intentionality in order to further clarify embodied intentionality. For 
Merleau-Ponty, operative intentionality is fundamentally a bodily inten-
tionality bound up with moving and coping in the world and not bound to 
consciousness of an object as an intellectual act (Landes 2013, 141). Op-
erative intentionality is conscious embodiments’ “I can” (Merleau-Ponty 
[1945] 1962, 159). It is an intentionality that comes to the fore when the 
world poses problems for the phenomenal body and the phenomenal 
body adapts its posture, movement, etc. to address the situation. The phe-
nomenal body exhibits a prereflective knowing that is a bodily knowing.
Merleau-Ponty offers the example of moving around one’s flat to il-
lustrate this. “My flat is, for me, not a set of closely associated images. It 
remains a familiar domain round about me only as long as I still have ‘in 
my hands’ or ‘in my legs’ the main distances and directions involved, and 
as long as from my body intentional threads run out towards it” (Merleau-
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Ponty [1945] 1962, 150). When a person walks through her home, she 
need not estimate the distance between her kitchen island and cabinets, 
nor does she need to turn on the light at night to find the bathroom. 
There is a knowledge “in her legs” that allows her to avoid the corner of 
the rug in her bedroom at night and a knowledge “in her hands” that gives 
her the ability to reach for a pan without thinking while cooking. 
The sedimentation of this operative intentionality that would allow one 
to move around one’s home in the way described above is called “habit.” 
Merleau-Ponty writes: 
The acquisition of habit is indeed the grasping of a significance, but 
it is the motor grasping of a motor significance. Now what precisely 
does this mean? . . . If I am in the habit of driving a car, I enter a nar-
row opening and see that I can “get through” without comparing the 
width of the opening with the width of the wings, just as I go through 
a doorway without checking the width of the doorway against that of 
my body. ([1945] 1962, 165)
While driving, the bodily actions necessary in order to pilot the car need 
not be at the forefront of consciousness. Instead, a series of habits allows 
the driver to drive the car “without thought.” The phenomenal body’s 
habits express a harmony between intention and action that is prereflec-
tive. More than this, however, the phenomenal body “takes up” the car 
into the body. To use an object the way one uses the car “is to be trans-
planted into them, or conversely, to incorporate them into the bulk of our 
own body” (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 1962, 166). The body not only makes 
sense of the world and its objects, but offers a unity between the body-
subject and world that involves the taking up of objects to act as extensions 
of one’s phenomenal body.
Habit expresses our power of dilating our being-in-the-world, or chang-
ing our existence by appropriating fresh instruments. It is possible to 
know how to type without being able to say where the letters which 
make the words are to be found on the banks of keys. To know how to 
type is not, then, to know the place of each letter among the keys, nor 
even to have acquired a conditioned reflex for each one, which is set 
in motion by the letter as it comes before our eye. If habit is neither 
a form of knowledge nor an involuntary action, what then is it? It is a 
knowledge in the hands, which is forthcoming only when a bodily effort 
is made, and cannot be formulated in detachment from that effort. 
(Merleau-Ponty [1945] 1962, 166)
Our body’s ability to form habits and to take up objects in the world as part 
of those habits offers us a distinct understanding of many objects in the 
world as manipulable and as objects that extend what we can do. When 
the phenomenal body encounters an object, unless one adopts an obser-
vational attitude toward the object, one uses the object. In the instance of 
the typewriter above, after one has become familiar with the typewriter, 
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once one has used the typewriter for some time, one does not look at the 
typewriter as a collection of discrete objects (keys, feed roller, paper shelf, 
etc.), but instead as an object to be used to write. Her bodily habit allows 
her to use the typewriter “without thought” and, in fact, to incorporate 
the typewriter into her bodily possibilities through habit. More than this, 
however, the typewriter might become essential to her for completing her 
projects. Insofar as she can type, she is a writer.
The Incorporation of the Smartphone
This understanding of habit is important for our understanding of the 
way in which the smartphone is taken up into bodily habit, “incorporating 
[it] into the bulk of our own body” (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 1962, 166). In 
The Absent Body, Drew Leder (1990) expands on Merleau-Ponty’s notion 
of incorporation as the taking up of objects into our bodily habits. Leder 
explains that “skill acquisition is accomplished via a process I will term 
incorporation. From the Latin corpus, or ‘body,’ the etymology of this word 
literally means to ‘bring within a body’” (30). When we fully incorporate 
a skill or an object and the skills its use requires, the skill(s) and/or the 
object become part of our body and its possibilities.
According to Leder, habits initially require “a complex series of the-
matizations” (Leder 1990, 30). As Leder uses it, thematization refers to the 
conceptualization of a skill such that it is broken down into specific parts 
in order to understand and perform said skill. In incorporation, the the-
matizations are superseded and the acquisition of a new skill comes along 
with an effacement of these thematizations. Through successful incorpo-
rations, skills become prereflective habits. Leder provides the example of 
a new swimmer to illustrate this. When one first learns how to swim, one 
must be aware of many different facets of the process of swimming. One 
must think about how to cup one’s hands and kick one’s feet, one must 
concentrate on timing turning one’s head and breathing while lifting an 
arm from the water, etc. With practice, however, this same swimmer will be 
able to perform these synchronized movements prereflectively. 
The original incorporation of the use of a smartphone follows this 
pattern.4 Although I previously owned mobile phones, the adaptation of 
smartphone technology involved a new and complex set of thematizations. 
I needed to adjust to the screen serving a dual purpose, both as keyboard 
and display. I needed to learn to use my thumbs on a digital QWERTY 
keyboard. I needed to learn how to find and open diverse applications for 
the various new uses of my phone. This meant “unlocking” my phone with 
a numerical password, which involved different bodily movements from 
what I normally associated with phone use, including swiping. Even the 
weight and size of the phone required adjustment. My hands are small and 
my first smartphone, the iPhone 4, was heavier and larger than my previ-
ous mobiles. I needed to think about the placement of the smartphone in 
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my hands in order to avoid dropping it and to be able to reach all of the 
parts of the screen that my fingers needed to be able to touch.5
Eventually these movements became so much a part of my bodily habit 
that the thematizations were entirely effaced. I no longer need to think 
about the weight of the phone and its placement in my hand. I do not 
need to “distance” myself from the phone in order to bring to mind the 
steps involved in unlocking my phone, locating an application, and open-
ing an application. Like Merleau-Ponty’s typewriter, I need not think about 
the placement of the keyboard keys on my phone as I text. I hardly “think” 
about my smartphone at all. Leder writes:
As a result of ongoing patterns of action, the body can develop au-
tomatic tendencies to repeat. I may fall into unreflective habits con-
cerning waking up and going to sleep, conducting myself on the job, 
interacting with colleagues, exercising, or relaxing. The vast reach of 
the “I can” contracts into the “I do,” that region of body possibility I 
actually use. Nor, because of the nature of incorporation, is it easy to 
excise or even recognize such habits. Over time they simply disappear 
from view. They are enveloped within the structure of the taken-for-
granted body from which I inhabit the world. (1990, 32)
When we incorporate skills or associated objects into our bodily habit, one 
of the results of that incorporation is the way in which we cease to recog-
nize the extent to which incorporation happens. Skills and objects used 
consistently become so much a part of what we do that we often forget 
that performance of the skill was something that required thematization 
and practice.
What makes the incorporation of the smartphone and associated skills 
more interesting phenomenologically than the incorporation of other 
objects is twofold. Although the incorporation of the smartphone follows 
the same pattern as the incorporation of different objects and skills, the 
incorporation of the smartphone is distinct because of both the degree to 
which mobiles are incorporated and the ways in which that incorporation 
is concealed the longer phones are used. To understand the degree of in-
corporation and concealment of our smartphones and “to articulate what 
was previously just lived out” (Taylor 2005, 32), a description of a morning 
at the author’s desk will be considered. 
When I arrive at work before I need to teach my first class, I sit at my 
desk, turn on my computer, and grab my phone from the front pocket 
of my satchel without thinking about the action, where it always resides 
when it is not in my hand or on my desk. I start work, but a flash of light 
alerts me to a new text message. After responding to the text, I realize I 
forgot to respond to a message I received on Snapchat the night before, so 
I open the application and respond. A few minutes later, I recognize that 
I have opened my Facebook application on my phone and am skimming 
an article about a bill before the House and vaguely remember having 
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read something about Sean Spicer tweeting a password. I do not recall 
what password or the source of this information. Recognizing I must get 
back to work, I close my phone’s open applications, and I realize that I 
have checked my weather application, my calendar, and my Twitter with-
out having consciously reflected on doing so. Strangely, although I do not 
remember what I looked at on Twitter or details about the weather fore-
cast for the day, I do note now that I have an appointment with a student 
I had forgotten. 
I return to work, frustrated with myself for being unthinkingly dis-
tracted for a few of my precious morning minutes. For the most part, my 
attention is back on my MacBook, but the time on my computer’s clock is 
not correct, so I find that I am checking my phone’s time every 4-5 min-
utes. One time, without initially recognizing what I am doing, I open the 
Facebook application, and only realize I have done it several minutes later.
What is striking about this experience is that this is all happening within 
a half hour’s time and I have done these things on my phone and not my 
computer. Although my computer’s screen is larger and I can type faster 
on my computer than my phone, it is my phone my hand picks up. More-
over, when I begin an activity that requires concentrated attention, I usu-
ally “hide” my phone. It is not enough to put it in my satchel—my hand 
reaches into my bag without my consciously reflecting on the action, often 
without awareness of the particular reason I reach for the object. It knows 
where my smartphone is, so I put my phone on a bookshelf out of reach.
This brief account of my morning is in some ways unremarkable, but 
in others, quite illustrative. When I think about the centrality of my smart-
phone to my morning’s activities, I realize my smartphone is an object un-
like others for me—there is no other object which is constantly on my per-
son and to which I turn so frequently. Although we do not make the claim 
that the use of the smartphone described above describes every person’s 
relationship to their smartphone, the purpose of offering this description 
is not to offer a universal account of smartphone use, but to open a space 
of reflection for the reader. Just as Leder’s “phenomenological example” 
of digestion (1990, 38), Merleau-Ponty’s descriptions of the typewriter and 
driving, as well as other similar phenomenological descriptions offered 
by philosophers (for example, Heidegger’s hammer ([1927] 1962, 98) or 
Husserl’s inkpot ([1900] 2001, 291), this description is offered in order to 
render what was familiar and unreflected upon less familiar and open to 
interpretation. This sort of illustration allows for clearer application of the 
phenomenological concepts discussed above to persons’ embodied rela-
tionships to their smartphones, though makes no claim to the universality 
of the relationship as it is described. The value of this sort of analysis lies 
not in its claims to universality of description, but in the reflective attitude 
it inspires in readers and researchers. 
Merleau-Ponty’s and Leder’s explanations of habit and incorporation 
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are particularly helpful for articulating the facets of my relationship to my 
smartphone and for understanding why and how it has obtained this status 
of object-unlike-any-other. We postulate that there are three features of 
the relationship between my body and my smartphone that are best un-
derstood in light of incorporation and habit. First, there is no other object 
that has been incorporated into my bodily schema so thoroughly. Second, 
my smartphone and my use of it is concealed from me in ways that are 
unparalleled. Finally, when my smartphone “has my attention,” whether 
it is a reflective attention or a prereflective attention, my intentionality 
fundamentally changes. We will discuss these in turn.
The extreme level of incorporation is the clearest feature of my rela-
tionship to my smartphone. Incorporation is both temporal and spatial. It 
is temporal because the smartphone and its use have become part of my 
body’s temporal history (Leder 1990, 32). Over time my body’s repeated, 
frequent use of this device “trains” my body to become used to having 
my smartphone ready to hand. This contributes to the spatial incorpora-
tion of my phone as an ever-present and literally ready-to-hand tool that 
my body has taken up as part of its schema. The smartphone requires so 
little of me, especially since temporally it has been part of my habits for 
eight years, that I have physically incorporated it like no other tool. It is 
always “on” me and ready to hand (Lasen 2004). I have my phone out in 
class because many of my classrooms do not have clocks (or functioning 
clocks). I have it on me when I am out to dinner, whether in my purse or 
on the table. I have my phone while I am watching television. Often, only 
after my phone is in my hand and I have opened an application to check 
on a tangential thought I have (e.g., I wonder how much this actor is paid) 
will I realize I have picked it up. My use of my phone in this instance is as 
prereflective as grabbing the blanket draped over the back of my couch 
when my feet get cold. 
This lack of recognition of the extent to which the smartphone has be-
come incorporated points to the way in which the smartphone and its use 
are concealed. Concealment refers to the way in which the smartphone 
and skills I have acquired in order to use it “simply disappear from view. 
They are enveloped within the structure of the taken-for-granted body 
from which I inhabit the world” (Leder 1990, 32). 
There are three ways in which my smartphone brings with it conceal-
ment, whether its own concealment or concealment it produces. First, 
there is functional concealment. This is the sort of concealment of most 
sorts of devices (Borgmann 1987). My smartphone is a tool that requires 
very little of me. As to its upkeep, the operating system and applications 
update automatically. Until the end of my phone’s life, the phone’s pro-
cessing is fast and there is near instantaneous access to any application. 
Unlocking the phone and opening applications requires little in the way 
of physicality or conscious thought given the level at which I have incor-
porated my smartphone. 
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Furthermore, given just how little my smartphone requires of me, the 
way in which it allows me to extend my “I can” with ease is worth remark. If 
I forget to send a gift to my mom for Mother’s Day, I can do it in less than 
two minutes with the tap of a finger to open my Amazon application, and 
a few more taps. I can use my Android Pay app when I forget my wallet and 
want a coffee at the campus Starbucks. I can use my smartphone to call 
someone at a distance. I can see my niece 1400 miles away in Minnesota 
instantaneously through Google Hangouts. I can check my email, listen 
to podcasts, watch Netflix, look at the campus gossip with any number of 
applications designed for anonymous posting. The incredible range of 
options available to me through this small and unimposing device can 
only remain unthought of in our daily lives because of the unparalleled 
functional concealment this device brings.
The functional concealment of my smartphone is related to its physical 
concealment. My smartphone is small compared to a computer or a tablet. 
It is light. It requires almost no energy to pick it up and put it down. I can 
carry it without fatiguing and easily forget that I am holding it. It fits into 
my pocket as well as palm. There are any number of products available 
that make specific room for my smartphone (purses, wallets) as well as 
allow me to attach it to my body (belt clips, runner’s bands). My smart-
phone’s physical concealment, given its size and the ways I have found to 
attach it to me, is practically a foregone conclusion.
Interestingly, it is not only that I feel comfortable with having my phone 
“on” me, it has been taken up so thoroughly into my phenomenal body 
that I feel more comfortable with my phone than I do without it. I feel out 
of sorts and anxious without my phone. When I realize I have forgotten 
my phone, something like a sense of “dread” settles in initially. How will I 
remember what is on my calendar for the day? Will I miss a meeting? Will 
I remember to print all the documents for the meetings, now that I cannot 
access them on my smartphone? Even driving to the grocery after work is 
experienced differently than it was before. I wonder whether that light 
that has been blinking on my dash is really just a simple wiring issue, and 
what I will do if my car breaks down. When it is “on” me, my phone might 
go unnoticed for hours. When I am without it, however, its absence inter-
rupts my regular activities. The absence of my phone is more available to 
me than its presence. This speaks to exceptional levels of concealment 
and incorporation. 
The third type of concealment is what I will call a “world” conceal-
ment. My smartphone distances me from other possibilities and experi-
ences without my explicit recognition that it does this. Things in my world 
fade from my recognition, and I can experience “a reduction of certain 
possibilities of encounter” (Leder 1990, 180). When I pick up my smart-
phone, my intentionality is directed toward a screen that both cuts off 
my attention to localized presences and pulls my attention to something 
not-physically-present. While sometimes my attention is directed toward a 
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person who is not physically present (e.g., my niece in Minnesota) or to 
something that allows me to work on a project that is present (e.g., find-
ing a needed article), often my smartphone just distracts me. I mindlessly 
scroll through Facebook, passively absorbing pictures of cute animals and 
headlines about potential nuclear disasters in turn. Given social norms, 
it is often taken for granted by many that smartphones will be out and 
used during personal and professional gatherings; thus, even being in the 
presence of actual others does not prevent me from withdrawing from the 
social world into the worlds given to me by my smartphone’s screen. This 
world concealment is hard to fight against, even when I recognize the ways 
in which my smartphone is detrimental to my attention and focus. I know 
my smartphone distances me from what is present even at times I do not 
want to be distanced from what is present, but my hand also knows where 
my phone is.
The extreme concealment and incorporation of smartphones is espe-
cially interesting for information literacy because of the third feature of 
my body’s relationship to my smartphone. My smartphone offers me con-
stant and unrestricted access to information via mobile applications. In 
some ways, the access to information granted to me by a smartphone is 
similar to the access offered by a computer or tablet, but how and how often 
I access information on my phone is different. When I look something 
up on my computer or tablet, it requires me to physically locate myself in 
front of the computer, or in the instance of my tablet, to search for it in 
blankets on my bed or couch. The same is not usually true of my phone. It 
is in my purse, to my right on the couch, or already in my hand. The access 
I have to my phone is unmatched.
Moreover, when I search out my computer or tablet, it is for a purpose. I 
know that I want to find information or do work, and thus, I find the device 
that will best allow me to accomplish that work. It is an act of volition when 
I pick up my computer or tablet. More importantly than this, however, 
we are often called away from our computers and tablets in regular ways, 
whether for meetings, or teaching, or to meet bodily needs. For many of 
us, however, our phones always remain in our pockets, readily accessible 
and often accessed, even when we are engaged in projects that take us 
away from our computers or tablets. While I am waiting for coffee to brew, 
my Facebook application is open on my smartphone before I realize I 
have picked up my phone, while my computer sits unused on my desk in 
another room. 
How and how often I access information on my smartphone is impor-
tant insofar as when I access this information on my smartphone, my re-
lationship to the information I am consuming hardly rises to the level of 
conscious awareness much of the time because of my smartphone’s incor-
poration and concealment. While scrolling through Facebook waiting for 
a meeting to start, I only partially notice what is written about the United 
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States bombing Syria in a friend’s post. Part of my attention is taken by my 
colleague taking the seat next to me and setting up her computer for the 
meeting. That I am passively absorbing such important and devastating 
information is cause for pause. 
Implications for Information Literacy
In the final part of this paper, we return to the applied LIS literature, and 
consider what this analysis can contribute to how we conceptualize and 
teach information literacy. We believe there is a place in existing conver-
sations about information literacy to take up the questions of how smart-
phones function as part of our prereflective bodily habit, what this means 
for our ability to think critically about the information we access through 
these devices, and what strategies are possible for disrupting this prere-
flective relationship.6 We will argue that the notion of dispositions, present 
in the Framework (ACRL 2015) and AASL standards (2007, 2009), among 
other places, offers a possible lens for understanding how this kind of 
disrupting could occur. 
* * *
As we highlighted at the outset, the library literature has said much about 
the promise of the mobile technology for ubiquitous information access 
and communication. While we do not deny that there have been, and con-
tinue to be, many positive consequences stemming from increased access 
and communication, there are challenges, too, as both our analysis and 
literature from other fields make clear. 
What would it look like to incorporate an awareness of the smartphone 
as a part of our prereflective bodily habit into our information literacy ef-
forts? In addition to exploring its impact on how we consume information, 
it should include considerations of taking a critical distance to incorpora-
tion of the smartphone into our bodily habit, and reflecting on what has 
heretofore been prereflective. This means recognizing the concealment 
and incorporation into our bodily habit of what is, for many of us, a pri-
mary mechanism for accessing information repeatedly throughout the 
day, and examining how this incorporation and concealment impact how 
we consume and reflect on the information accessed. 
Disrupting this aspect of our bodily habit will involve becoming con-
scious of our embodied relationships to our smartphones, and cultivating 
reflectiveness about what has previously been prereflective. This means 
drawing back and observing ourselves as we pick up our smartphones 
throughout the day. Is there a certain emotion or feeling (boredom? anxi-
ety? stress? curiosity?) present when we feel the urge to pick it up? Does 
picking it up alleviate or exacerbate this feeling? When we notice ourselves 
scrolling through social media or other information feeds, what informa-
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tion have we consumed? Did we interact with it or think critically about it? 
Because we are observing not just our thought processes, but our bodily 
comportment and our emotions, becoming mindful of these aspects of 
our embodied relationship to our smartphones involves more than meta-
cognition. Indeed, we could think of this disruption of our bodily habit as 
a way of incorporating new and more intentional habits, with the goal that 
eventually they become incorporated so fully that they are our default.
Finding a Place for Disrupting in Existing Information Literacy Discussions
Are the practices described above compatible in any sense with existing 
notions of information literacy? Running alongside dominant understand-
ings of information literacy as a set of cognitive skills and competencies, 
exemplified by the Association of College & Research Libraries’ (ACRL) 
Information Literacy Competency Standards for Higher Education (2000), have 
been alternative accounts that emphasize the role of the affective domain 
in the information experience. The affective domain “comprises a per-
son’s attitudes, emotions, interests, motivation, self-efficacy, and values” 
(Schroeder and Cahoy 2010, 130). In the 1980s, scholars Constance Mel-
lon and Carol Kuhlthau developed theories of library anxiety and the 
Information Search Process (ISP), respectively, both of which operated 
from an understanding of the research and information-seeking process 
as involving significant affective components (Schroeder & Cahoy 2010, 
132). Research into the affective dimension of information literacy has 
continued throughout subsequent decades, contributing to a “new per-
spective of information literacy research and practice where the informa-
tion seeker was viewed as a whole person” (Kay and Ahmadpour 2015, 4).
Although educational objectives are often articulated in a way that sepa-
rates cognitive, affective, and psychomotor dimensions, this separation is 
not actually possible in “real-life learning situations” (Martin and Briggs 
1986, 9). Learning how to disrupt this bodily habit will involve elements 
that can be recognized as cognitive, affective, and corporeal. In the analy-
sis offered above, for example, in order for the author to have disrupted 
her prereflective relationship to her phone, she would have needed to 
have brought to her awareness several things. Knowing, as she does, the 
prereflective nature of her relationship to her smartphone, she would 
have needed to assess whether on the given day and at the given time she 
was alert enough to keep her smartphone next to her. In the morning, 
this author often feels a little sluggish and anxious while thinking about 
the day ahead and the classrooms she needs to run. She is often easily dis-
tracted in the first hour of her work because of her lack of alertness and 
energy. Knowing her predilection toward anxiousness, her lessened ability 
to maintain focus, and her general bodily sluggishness, she recognizes that 
putting her phone in a desk drawer might help combat the unthinking 
way in which she reaches for her phone. Without assessing her bodily, 
cognitive, and affective states like this, however, it is likely she would un-
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thinkingly put her phone to the right of her computer as she always does. 
Understanding disrupting in this way is in keeping with Merleau-Ponty’s 
notion of embodied consciousness, where the body is essential to the de-
velopment of subjectivity and our ability to make meaning in the world, 
and thus an inseparable part of learning any cognitive or affective skill.
 Disrupting Bodily Habit as a Disposition. One avenue for thinking about 
how these practices can be incorporated into existing discussions about 
information literacy is through the concept of dispositions. This concept, 
sometimes referred to as “thinking dispositions” (Tishman and Andrade 
1996), developed out of the fields of educational psychology and philoso-
phy of education, and occurs in information literacy scholarship and pro-
fessional association documents, including the American Association of 
School Librarians’ (AASL) Standards for the 21st-Century Learner (2007) 
and Standards for the 21st-Century Learner in Action (2009) and the Associa-
tion of College & Research Libraries’ (ACRL) Framework for Information 
Literacy for Higher Education (2015)
Dispositions have been defined as “tendencies toward particular pat-
terns of intellectual behavior” (Tishman and Andrade 1996, under “How 
are Thinking Dispositions Defined?” para. 1), such as “mindfulness,” 
“pay[ing] attention to given context,” and “[being] open to new infor-
mation” (under “What Kinds of Thinking Dispositions Are There?” para. 
3). The American Association of School Librarians defines dispositions 
as “the learning behaviors, attitudes, and habits of mind that transform a 
learner from one who is able to learn to one who actually does learn” (AASL 
2009, 14); examples include maintaining a critical stance and asking ques-
tions of information sources. In the ACRL Framework, dispositions are the 
“affective, attitudinal, or valuing dimension of learning” that ought to de-
velop alongside cognitive proficiencies or “knowledge practices” in the 
process of becoming information literate (2015, under “Introduction,” 
para. 2). Implicit in the notion of a disposition is the insight that think-
ing well involves more than just cognitive or intellectual ability. It must 
also include certain “motivations, attitudes, values and habits of mind” 
(Tishman and Andrade 1996, under “Introduction,” para. 1), such as a 
“critical spirit” and a “probing inquisitiveness” (Kwon, Onwuegbuzie, and 
Alexander 2007, 270).
The concept of dispositions has been taken up in LIS scholarship as a 
way to think about addressing hurdles to information literacy that are not 
purely cognitive. Kwon, Onwuegbuzie, and Alexander (2007) urge librar-
ians to nurture in students positive dispositions toward critical thinking as 
a way to overcome library anxiety. Schroeder and Cahoy (2010) draw on 
a Delphi study that found numerous affective dispositions associated with 
critical thinking (Facione 1990) to offer a model of information literacy 
that incorporates affective dispositions into student learning outcomes. 
And Folk (2016, 303) argues that librarians should “value” and “promote” 
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dispositions toward lifelong learning and higher-order thinking in work-
ing with students. 
The practice of disrupting described above, with its emphasis on culti-
vating not just the ability but the habit of being mindful and reflective, can 
be understood as a type of dispositional tendency, and in this way, can be 
brought into conversation with existing literature on the role of disposi-
tions in information literacy. We would go farther, however, and suggest 
that the concept disposition be expanded to include the tendency or moti-
vation to pay attention not only to one’s intellectual and affective behavior 
but also to one’s bodily comportment. Just as the description of one of the 
author’s mornings with her smartphone was designed to promote reflec-
tion in the reader about her own use of her smartphone, the concept of 
disposition in LIS and education literature allows for the cultivation of 
“new information” in students through their own reflections on how their 
smartphones actually appear in their daily dealings. Moreover, having stu-
dents reflect on the ways in which our bodies affect the way in which we 
access and interact with information and devices that deliver information 
should be acknowledged as an important part of fostering advantageous 
dispositions in students. In other words, this particular disposition involves 
cultivating a critical spirit not only toward our thinking and feeling about 
the information we encounter but also toward our embodied relationship 
with our smartphones and the ways in which this prereflective relationship 
mediates our information experiences. 
Conclusion
Merleau-Ponty’s description of the role of human embodiment in con-
sciousness, and specifically the habits of the phenomenal body, and Led-
er’s expansion on Merleau-Ponty’s research into the phenomenal body, 
offer a rich foundation for theorizing our embodied relationship to in-
formation via our smartphones. Understanding the role of embodiment 
in information access allows us to operate from a fuller understanding of 
the way in which information is accessed, as well as the unintended, often 
unseen, effects of this method of access. This requires an understanding 
of the role of embodiment in information access. With this paper, we have 
drawn on Merleau-Ponty and Leder to offer an analysis of the body’s re-
lationship to the smartphone using phenomenological concepts, and to 
think through some of the implications for information literacy. How our 
smartphones are incorporated into our prereflective bodily habits, and 
what this means for how we interact with and consume information, are 
important questions for those who are interested in information literacy 
to consider. 
Can we help cultivate the disposition described above in the informa-
tion literacy classroom? Some have argued that thinking dispositions are 
best taught through enculturation—that is, by using “exemplars, interac-
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tion, and instruction” to foster a culture in the classroom that values these 
dispositions (Tishman and Jay 1993, 150). We admit that it is likely impos-
sible to establish a classroom culture within a single information literacy 
session. Therefore, opportunities will need to be found to work with stu-
dents for a sustained period of time, either in cooperation with a course 
faculty member or through a credit-bearing information literacy course. 
Developing activities and coursework that help students learn to suspend 
their everyday attitudes regarding their smartphones and educating them 
on some of the phenomenological concepts in this paper may very well be 
an important step to encouraging a curiosity about the ways in which their 
relationship to their smartphones is more complicated than it might origi-
nally seem. Further research into how best to acquaint students with ap-
plied phenomenological thinking is a necessary next step for application 
of our theoretical findings in the classroom.7 We hope that our research 
will lead others to explore how our embodied relationships to mobile de-
vices mediate how we consume and interact with information, and what 
this means for future information literacy efforts.
Notes 
1. For a clear statement of the intent of applied philosophical phenomenology, see Eddles-
Hirsch’s “Phenomenology and Educational Research” (2015, 251). Like Eddles-Hirsch, 
we maintain the importance of qualitative reflection on the experience of a phenom-
enon and the meaning that experience creates in the world of the subject and believe this 
sort of analysis offers important information that might not be discovered in traditional 
empirical research. Merriam (2009) and Christensen, Johnstone, and Turner (2010) also 
address the methodological distinctions between empirical research and phenomeno-
logical analysis.
2. Here we follow the example of Connell (1996) and Barnacle (2009). Connell explores the 
implications of Don Ihde’s phenomenology of technology in order to explain how best to 
use and instruct students how to use computers, expressly addressing the importance of 
critical reflection on the use of technology in our everyday lives. It is a mistake, the author 
explains, to approach computer use merely as the use of any other tool (6). Instead, the 
author insists we must see that technologies, like computers, have a sort of intentionality 
and change humans’ relationships to and perception of their environments (12). Barnacle 
(2009) writes on the advances of understanding of the role of the body in learning, spe-
cifically the way in which the phenomenological models of Merleau-Ponty and Dreyfus, 
among others, posit a central place for the body in understanding and learning. Barnacle 
argues that the recognition of the centrality of the body means that the old trope of the 
“life of the mind” is no longer sufficient for understanding learning and that “informal 
modes of knowing in learning,” including embodied knowing, must be explored (32). Our 
project runs parallel to these projects insofar as we look to explore how phenomenological 
aspects of embodiment affect the way in which we understand the use of one particular 
form of technology, the smartphone.
3. Little in LIS has been written on the work of Merleau-Ponty. What has been written about 
Merleau-Ponty often comes as part of an author offering a general background in phe-
nomenology in order to argue for the potential relevance of phenomenological analysis 
to information science work (see, for example, Budd 2005; Fenwick 2003; and Wilson 
2003), yet few account for Merleau-Ponty’s theories pertaining to embodiment. Marjorie 
O’Loughlin (1998) discusses the importance of Merleau-Ponty’s work for a proper under-
standing of the body in education. She critiques postmodern accounts of the body and uses 
Dewey, Nietzsche, and Merleau-Ponty as “resources for rehabilitating a notion of human 
embodiment that is at once material, individual and social” (275). O’Loughlin does not 
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restrict her treatment to Merleau-Ponty and only suggests how Merleau-Ponty’s work might 
shape more specific future discussions. Annemaree Lloyd (2014) argues for the centrality 
of bodies in information experience by examining the experience of emergency service 
personnel and exploration of the “role of body as a locus for understanding and meaning 
making” (85). Her philosophical focus in analysis, however, is not strictly Merleau-Pontian. 
She offers a philosophical account of the body in Foucault and Dewey, as well (89). 
4. The shift from the first-person plural to the first-person singular here is intentional. The 
author writing this section is offering an individual phenomenological analysis of her own 
experience. She is detailing her own experience with her smartphone in order to describe 
her phone as it actually appears in everyday experience. This requires bringing to the 
fore of contemplation that which normally remains unthought. This form of observation 
requires inner observation and an attempt to suspend the natural attitude spoken of above 
to get at the phenomenon as it is encountered in immediate, prereflective experience. 
The use of the first-person singular here is methodologically more appropriate than the 
use of the first-person plural.
5. There is a diverse and fairly substantial phenomenology of telephony literature, but what we 
seek to accomplish here is different from what has been previously written. The literature 
in phenomenology of telephony can roughly be broken down into three “types” of litera-
ture. One part of the literature offers a phenomenology of the mobile phone qua mobile 
phone. For instance, Michael Arnold (2003) exposes the mobile’s Janus-faced nature and 
explains that the mobile is “not reducible to a direction or valence tipped with a single ar-
rowhead, but better understood as a conflation of tangential implications” (234). He does 
not rely on an explicitly phenomenological methodology, however. Ingrid Richardson’s 
work (2005 and 2007) comes closer to offering “phenomenologies” of the mobile phone, 
but her use of phenomenology more closely aligns with “empirical phenomenology” as 
defined by social scientists (see, for instance, Groenewald 2004; Hein and Austin 2001; 
and Kafle 2013).
   Another segment of the literature is concerned with the way in which mobile devices 
have shifted our experience of space and time. Anthony Townsend (2002) coins the term 
“phonespace” to indicate the way in which mobile devices have made the possibility of 
interruption ubiquitous (70). He argues that given this possibility of a person to interrupt 
us at any time in any place, mobile phones have redefined temporal and spatial patterns 
of sociality. Related analysis on the effect of mobile media on spatiality, especially locative 
media, are also found in the literature (see Farman 2012 and Lasen 2004). 
   We discovered one philosophical, phenomenologically grounded analysis of the mobile 
phone offered in the phenomenology of telephony literature. In “Where are You? A Hei-
deggerian Analysis of the Mobile Phone,” Fernando Ilharco (2007) offers a phenomeno-
logical analysis of the mobile phone rooted in the work of Heidegger, but does not offer 
an extended account of embodied intentionality or reference the work of Merleau-Ponty. 
6. Barnacle (2009) is instructive here. Barnacle writes on the advances of understanding 
of the role of the body in learning, specifically the way in which the phenomenological 
models Merleau-Ponty and Dreyfus, among others, posit a central place for the body in 
understanding and learning. Barnacle argues that the recognition of the centrality of the 
body means that the old trope of the “life of the mind” is no longer sufficient for under-
standing learning and that “informal modes of knowing in learning,” including embodied 
knowing, must be explored (32). The concept of dispositions also challenges the idea that 
the “life of the mind” and learning are strictly cognitive, that is, removed from affect, 
embodiment, etc.
7. We have some helpful examples of the integration of phenomenological reflection into 
the classroom to follow. Helberg, Heyes, and Rohel (2009) detailed the importance of 
educating students in both somatic theory and somatic practice in a course dedicated to 
yoga and philosophy. In the course, students applied theory, including concepts from Drew 
Leder’s work, in order to better understand their embodied practices (276). Standal and 
Engelsrud (2011) look at the potential place of phenomenology in physical education 
contexts, specifically rehabilitation centers and dance students, asking students to reflect 
on their embodied experiences using phenomenologically inspired questions and lines of 
inquiry. Østergaard, Dahlin, and Hugo (2008) offer helpful examples of the integration of 
phenomenological methods and concepts into the classroom in “Doing Phenomenology 
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in Science Education: A Research Review.” They explain that incorporating education in 
phenomenology into science education curriculum is a way to “‘ground’ scientific concepts 
in concrete lifeworld experience” (106). They detail the work of two scientists, Michael 
Faraday, who took an experimental approach to scientific study and “‘[let] nature speak 
for herself’” (108), and Martin Wagenschein, who argued against “the division of the world 
into a part that can be sensed and experienced and a theoretical part” (110).
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